When starting a new collective venture, it is important to understand partners' motives and how strongly they commit to common goals. Arranging prior commitments or agreements on how to behave has been shown to be an evolutionary viable strategy in the context of cooperation dilemmas, ensuring high levels of mutual cooperation among self-interested individuals. However, in many situations, commitments can be used to achieve other types of collective behaviours such as coordination. Coordination is arguably more complex to achieve since there might be multiple desirable collective outcomes in a coordination problem (compared to mutual cooperation, the only desirable outcome in cooperation dilemmas), especially when these outcomes entail asymmetric benefits or payoffs for those involved. Using methods from Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), herein we study how prior commitments can be adopted as a tool for enhancing coordination when its outcomes exhibit an asymmetric payoff structure. Our results, both by numerical simulations and analytically, show that whether prior commitment would be a viable evolutionary mechanism for enhancing coordination strongly depends on the collective benefit of coordination, and more importantly, how asymmetric benefits are resolved in a commitment deal.
Introduction
Achieving collective behaviours among individuals with their own personal interest is an important social challenge in various societies (Ostrom, 1990; Pitt et al., 2012) . From coordinating individuals in the workplace to maintaining cooperative relationship between nations, it is often jeopardised by individual self-interest. The study of mechanisms that support the evolution of such collective behaviours has been of great interest in many disciplines, ranging from Evolutionary Biology, Economics, Physics and Computer Science (Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2010; West et al., 2007; Han, 2013) . Several mechanisms that can promote the emergence and stability of collective behaviours among such individuals, have been proposed. They include kin and group selection, direct and indirect reciprocities, spatial networks, reward and punishment (Nowak, 2006) .
Recently, the capacity to create, and commit to, prior agreements (Nesse, 2001; Frank, 1988; Han et al., 2017 Han et al., , 2015a has been proposed as an evolutionarily viable strategy inducing cooperative behaviour in the context of cooperation dilemmas; namely, the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and the Public Goods Game (PGG) (Han et al., 2017) . It provides an alternative to different forms of punishment against inappropriate behaviour and of rewards to stimulate the appropriate one (Martinez-Vaquero et al., 2015; Sasaki et al., 2015; Powers et al., 2012) . These works have solely focused on the roles of commitments for enhancing mutual cooperation among self-interested individuals. However, commitments can be adopted as a tool for enhancing other types of collective behaviour such as coordination (Nesse, 2001; Ostrom, 1990; Barrett, 2016) . In the context of cooperation dilemma games such as the PD and PGG (Nowak, 2006) , mutual cooperation is the only desirable collective outcome to which all parties are required to commit if an agreement is to be arranged. In contrast, in a coordination problem, there might be multiple optimal or desirable collective outcomes and players might have distinct, incompatible preferences regarding which outcome a mutual agreement should aim to achieve (e.g. due to asymmetric payoffs). Consider for instance a situation where two investment firms competing within a same product market who need to make strategic decision on which technology to adopt (Zhu and Weyant, 2003) , a low-benefit (L) or a highbenefit (H) technology. Individually, adopting H would lead to a larger benefit. However, if both firms invest on H they would end up competing with each other leading to a smaller accumulated benefit than if they could coordinate with each other to choose different technologies. However, given the asymmetry in the benefits in such an outcome, clearly no firm would want to commit to the outcome where its option is L, unless some form of compensation from the one selecting H can be ensured.
In this paper, we explore how arranging a prior agreement or commitment can be used as a mechanism for enhancing coordination and social welfare in this type of coordination problems. Before individuals embark on a joint venture, a pre-agreement makes the motives and intentions of all parties involved more transparent, thereby enabling an easier coordination of personal interests (Nesse, 2001; Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Han et al., 2015b) . Although our approach is applicable for a wide range of coordination problems (e.g. single market product investments as described above), we will use technology investment strategic decision making as a case study, allowing us to describe the problem clearly. Namely, we will describe a technology adoption game capturing the competitive market and decision-making process among firms adopting new technologies (Zhu and Weyant, 2003) , with a key parameter α representing how competitive the market is (thus describing how important coordination is). Similar to previous commitment models, we will rely on theoretical analysis and numerical simulations based on dynamical methods from Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) .
Our results show that whether pre-commitment would be a viable mechanism for enhancing coordination and social welfare strongly depends on α. Moreover, we demonstrate that agreements for coordination (with asymmetric benefits) exhibit more complex decision points than in previous models on cooperation dilemmas, leading to a larger behavioural space and a larger set of strategies. For instance, the firms will need to decide which desirable coordination outcome they want to propose to others. Moreover, since for such a coordination outcome, players receive different benefits, a commitment proposer needs to decide how much compensation for the one who agrees to commit to select L is required, depending on the cost of arranging commitments as well as the costs and benefits of adopting available technologies. We show that the outcome of evolutionary dynamics significantly depends on the compensation amounts.
The next section discusses related work, which is followed by a description of our models and details of the EGT methods for analysing them. Results of the analysis and a final discussion will then follow.
Related Work
The problem of explaining the emergence and stability of collective behaviours has been actively addressed in different disciplines (Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2010) . Among other mechanisms, such as reciprocity and costly punishment, closely related to our present model is the study of cooperative behaviours and pre-commitment in cooperation dilemmas, for both two-player and multiplayer games (Han et al., , 2017 Sasaki et al., 2015) . It has shown that to enhance cooperation commitments need to be sufficiently enforced and the cost of setting up the commitments is justified with respect to the benefit derived from the interactions-both by means of theoretical analysis and of behavioural experiments (Ostrom, 1990; Cherry and McEvoy, 2013) . Our results show that this same observation is seen for coordination problems. However, arranging commitments for enhancing coordination is more complex, exhibiting a larger behavioural space, and furthermore, their outcomes strongly depend on new factors only appearing in coordination problems; namely, a successful commitment deal needs to take into account the fact that multiple desirable collective outcomes exist for which players have incompatible preferences; and thus how benefits can be shared through compensations in order to resolve the issues of asymmetric benefits, is crucially important.
There have been several works studying the evolution of coordination, using the so-called Stag Hunt game, see e.g. (Skyrms, 2003; Pacheco et al., 2009; Santos et al., 2006; Sigmund, 2010) . However, to the best of our knowledge there has been no work studying how prior commitments can be modelled and used for enhancing the outcome of the evolution of coordination. As our results below show, significant enhancement of coordination and population welfare can be achieved via the arrangement of suitable commitment deals.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that commitments have been studied extensively in Artificial Intelligence and Multiagent systems literature, see e.g. (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010; Chopra and Singh, 2009; Rzadca et al., 2015) . Differently from our work, these studies utilise commitments for the purpose of regulating individual and collective behaviours, formalising different aspects of commitments (such as norms and conventions) in multi-agent systems. However, our results and approach provide important new insights into the design of such systems as these require commitments to ensure high levels of efficient collaboration and coordination within a group or team of agents. For example, by providing suitable agreement deals agents can improve the chance that a desirable collective outcome (which is best for the systems as a whole) is reached even when benefits provided by the outcome are different for the parties involved.
Models and Methods
We first describe a two-player technology adoption game then extend it with the option of arranging prior commitments before the game. We then describe our method based on Evolutionary Game Theory for finite populations, for analysing the games.
Technology Adoption (TD) game
We consider the scenario that two firms (players) compete for the same product market, and they need to make a (strategic) decision on which technology to invest on, a low-benefit (L) or a high-benefit (H) technology. The outcome of the interaction can be described in terms of costs and benefits of investments by the following payoff matrix (for row player):
where c L , c H and b L , b H (b L ≤ b H ) represent the costs and benefits of investing on L and H, respectively; α ∈ (0, 1)
indicates the competitive level of the product market: the firms receive a partial benefit if they both choose to invest on the same technology. Collectively, the smaller α is (i.e. the higher the market competitiveness), the more important that the firms coordinate to choose different technologies. The entries of the payoff matrix are denoted by a, b, c, d, as above. We have b > a and c > d. Without loss of generality, we assume that H would generate a greater net benefit, i.e.
Note that although we describe our model in terms of technology adoption decision making, it is generally applicable to many other coordination problems for instance wherever there are strategic investment decisions to make (in competitive markets of any products).
Commitments
We now describe our extended model where players can arrange a prior commitment before a TD interaction. A commitment proposal is to ask the co-player to adopt a different technology. That is, a strategist intending to use H (resp., L) would ask the co-player to adopt L (resp., H). We denote these commitment proposing strategies as HP and LP, respectively. Similarly to previous models of commitments (for PD and PGG) (Han et al., , 2015a , to make the commitment deal reliable, a proposer pays an arrangement cost . If the co-player agrees with the deal, then the proposer assumes that the opponent will adopt the agreed choice, yet there is no guarantee that this will actually be the case. Thus whenever a co-player refuses to commit, HP and LP would play H in the game. When the co-player accepts the commitment though later does not honour it, she has to compensate the honouring co-player at a personal cost δ.
Differently from previous models on PD and PGG where an agreed outcome leads to the same payoff for all parties in the agreement (mutual cooperation benefit), in the current model such an outcome would lead to different payoffs for those involved. Therefore, as part of the agreement, HP would compensate after the game an amount θ 1 to accepted player that honours the agreement; while LP would request a compensation θ 2 from such an accepted co-player.
Besides HP and LP, we consider a minimal model with the following (basic) strategies in this commitment version:
• Non-proposing acceptors, HC and LC, who always commit when being proposed a commitment deal wherein they are willing to adopt any technology proposed (even when it is different from their intended choice), honour the adopted agreement, but do not propose a commitment themselves. They play their intended choice, i.e. H and L, respectively, when there is no agreement in place;
• Non-acceptors, HN and LN, who do not accept commitment, play their intended choice during the game, and do not propose commitments;
• Fake committers, HF and LF, who accept a commitment proposal yet play the choice opposite to what has been agreed whenever the game takes place. These players assume that they can exploit the commitment proposing players without suffering the consequences;
Note that similar to the commitment models for the PD game , some possible strategies have been excluded from the analysis since they are dominated by at least one of the strategies in any configuration of the game: they can be omitted without changing the outcome of the analysis. For example, those who propose a commitment (i.e. paying a cost ) but then do not honour (thus have to pay the compensation when facing a honouring acceptors) would be dominated by the corresponding non-proposers.
Together the model consists of eight strategies that define the following payoff matrix, capturing the average payoffs that each strategy will receive upon interaction with one of the other seven strategies (where we denote λ = θ 1 + θ 2 ,
Note that when two commitment proposers interact only one of them will need to pay the cost of setting up the commitment. Yet, as either one of them can take this action they pay this cost only half of the time (on average). In addition, the average payoff of HP when interacting with LP is given by 1
We say that an agreement is fair if both parties obtain the same benefit when they honour it (after having taken into account the cost of setting up the agreement). For that, we can show that θ 1 and θ 2 must satisfy θ 1 = b−c− 2 and θ 2 = b−c+ 2 1 , and thus, both parties obtain b+c− 2 . With these conditions it also ensures that the payoffs of HP and LP when interacting with each other are equal.
Our analysis below will first focus on whether and when the fair agreements can lead to improvement in terms of coordination and the overall social welfare (i.e. average population payoff). We will then study how different kinds of agreements (varying θ 1 and θ 2 ) affect the outcome.
Evolutionary Dynamics
In this work, we will perform theoretical analysis and numerical simulations (see next section) using EGT methods for finite populations (Nowak et al., 2004; Imhof et al., 2005) . In such a setting, individuals' payoff represents their fitness or social success, and evolutionary dynamics is shaped by social learning (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010) , whereby the most successful individuals will tend to be imitated more often by the other individuals. In the current work, social learning is modelled using the so-called pairwise comparison rule (Traulsen et al., 2006) , a standard approach in EGT, assuming that an individual A with fitness f A adopts the strategy of another individual B with fitness f B with probability p given by the Fermi function, p A,
The parameter β represents the 'imitation strength' or 'intensity of selection', i.e., how strongly the individuals base their decision to imitate on fitness difference between themselves and the opponents. For β = 0, we obtain the limit of neutral drift -the imitation decision is random. For large β, imitation becomes increasingly deterministic.
In the absence of mutations or exploration, the end states of evolution are inevitably monomorphic: once such a state is reached, it cannot be escaped through imitation. We thus further assume that, with a certain mutation probability, an individual switches randomly to a different strategy without imitating another individual. In the limit of small mutation rates, the dynamics will proceed with, at most, two strategies in the population, such that the behavioural dynamics can be conveniently described by a Markov Chain, where each state represents a monomorphic population, whereas the transition probabilities are given by the fixation probability of a single mutant (Imhof et al., 2005; Nowak et al., 2004) . The resulting Markov Chain has a stationary distribution, which characterises the average time the population spends in each of these monomorphic end states.
Let N be the size of the population. Denote π X,Y the payoff a strategist X obtains in a pairwise interaction with strategist Y (defined in the payoff matrices). Suppose there are at most two strategies in the population, say, k individuals using strategy A (0 ≤ k ≤ N ) and (N − k) individuals using strategies B. Thus, the (average) payoff of the individual that uses A and B can be written as follows, respectively,
Now, the probability to change the number k of individuals using strategy A by ± one in each time step can be written as (Traulsen et al., 2006 )
The fixation probability of a single mutant with a strategy A in a population of (N − 1) individuals using B is given by (Traulsen et al., 2006; Nowak et al., 2004) 
Considering a set {1, ..., q} of different strategies, these fixation probabilities determine a transition matrix M = {T ij } q i,j=1 , with T ij,j =i = ρ ji /(q − 1) and T ii = 1 − q j=1,j =i T ij , of a Markov Chain. The normalised eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 1 of the transposed of M provides the stationary distribution described above (Imhof et al., 2005) , describing the relative time the population spends adopting each of the strategies.
Risk-dominance An important measure to compare the two strategies A and B is which direction the transition is stronger or more probable, an A mutant fixating in a population of individuals using B, ρ B,A , or a B mutant fixating in the population of individuals using A, ρ A,B . It can be shown that the former is stronger, in the limit of large N , if (Nowak et al., 2004; Sigmund, 2010) 
Results

Conditions for the viability of commitments
First of all, using pair-wise analysis (using Equation 6) it can be shown that if θ 1 + θ 2 < b − c then HP is preferred (i.e. risk-dominant, see Methods) to LP. Otherwise, LP is risk-dominant against HP. We now derive the conditions regarding the commitment parameters for which HP and LP are viable strategies, i.e. when they are risk-dominant against all other non-proposing strategies. Namely, using Equation 6 we can derive that HP and LP are risk-dominant against all other six non-proposing strategies, respectively, if and only if
Note that each element in the min expressions above corresponds to the condition for one of the six non-proposing strategies HN, LN, HC, LC, HF, LF, respectively. In general, the commitment proposing strategies dominate the population whenever is sufficiently small and δ is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the smaller α, these commitment strategies dominate for a wider range of and δ, especially when α is smaller. Parameters: in all panels cH = 1, cL = 1, bL = 2 (i.e. c = 1), and bH = 6 (i.e. b = 5). Other parameters: β = 0.1; population size N = 100; Fair agreements are used, where θ1 and θ2 are given by θ1 = (b − c − )/2 and θ2 = (b − c + )/2. Thus, we can derive the conditions for θ 1 , θ 2 and δ:
In particular, for fair agreements, i.e. θ 1 = (b − c − )/2 and θ 2 = (b − c + )/2, we obtain
Since the first inequality can be simplified further, we obtain
(since 3b − c − 2d > b + c − 2 max{a, d}, which is due to b > c and max{a, d} ≥ d) In general, these conditions indicate that for commitments to be a viable option for improving coordination, the cost of arrangement must be sufficiently small while the compensation associated with the contract needs to be sufficiently large (see already Figure 2 for numerical validation). Furthermore, for the first condition to hold, it is necessary that b + c > 2 max{a, d}. It means that the total payoff of two players when playing the TD game is always greater when they can coordinate to choose different technologies, than when they both choose the same technology.
Moreover, the conditions in Equation 10 can be expressed in terms of α and the costs and benefits of investment, as follows (see again the payoff matrices in Equation 1)
which can be rewritten as
where γ = max{ , 3 − 4δ}. This condition indicates under what condition of the market competitiveness and the costs and benefits of investing in available technologies, commitments can be an evolutionarily viable mechanism. Intuitively, for given costs and benefits of investment (i.e. fixing c L , c H , b L , b H ) , a larger cost of arranging a (reliable) agreement, , leads to a smaller threshold of α where commitment is viable. Moreover, given a commitment system (i.e. fixing and δ), assuming similar costs of investment for the two technologies, then a larger ratio of the benefits obtained from the two technologies, b H /b L , leads to a smaller upper bound for α for which commitment is viable.
Remarkably, our numerical analysis below (see already Figure 1 ) shows that the condition in Equation 11 accurately predicts the threshold of α where commitment proposing strategies (i.e. HP and LP) are highly abundant in the population, leading to improvement in terms of the average population payoff compared to when commitment is absent (Figure 3) .
Numerical Results
We calculate the stationary distribution in a population of eight strategies, HP, LP, HN, LN, HC, LC, HF and LF, using methods described above. In Figure 1 , we show the frequency of these strategies as a function of α, for different values of and game configurations. In general, the commitment proposing strategies HP and LP dominate the population when α is small while HN and HC dominate when α is sufficiently large. That is, commitment proposing strategies are viable and successful whenever the market competitiveness is high, leading to the need of efficient coordination among the competing players/firms to ensure high benefits.
Notably, we observe that the thresholds of α below which HP and LP are dominant, closely corroborate the analytical condition described in Equation 11, in all cases. Namely, for the parameter values in the first and second rows of Figure 1, α ≈ 0.66, 0 .58, 0.5 and α ≈ 0.81, 0.67, 0.5, for α = 0.1, 1, 2, respectively. Figure 4 : Average population payoff as a function of θ1 and θ2, for different values of α. When α is small (panels a and b), the highest average payoff is achieved when θ1 is sufficiently small and θ2 is sufficiently large, while for large α (panel c), it is the case when θ1 is sufficiently large and θ2 is sufficiently small. Parameters: in all panels cH = 1, cL = 1, bL = 2 (i.e. c = 1), and bH = 6 (i.e. b = 5). Other parameters: δ = 4, = 1; β = 0.1; population size N = 100.
This observation is robust for varying commitment parameters, i.e. the cost of arranging commitment, , and the compensation cost associated with commitment, δ, see Figure 2. Namely, we show the total frequency of commitment strategies (i.e. sum of the frequencies of HP and LP) for varying these parameters and for different values of α. It can be seen that, in general, the commitment strategies dominate the population whenever is sufficiently small and δ is sufficiently large. This observation is in accordance with previous commitment modelling works for the cooperation dilemma games (Han et al., , 2015a (Han et al., , 2017 . Furthermore, we observe that in the current coordination problem, that the smaller α is, these commitment strategies dominate the population for wider range of and δ. Our additional results show that these observations are robust with respect to other game configurations. Now, in order to determine whether and when commitments can actually lead to meaningful improvement, in Figure 3 , we compare the average population payoff or social welfare when a commitment is present and when it is absent. In general, it can be seen that when α is sufficiently small (below a threshold), the smaller it is, the greater improvement of social welfare is achieved through the presence of a commitment deal. Moreover, the smaller the cost of arranging commitments, , the greater improvement is obtained. On the other hand, when α is sufficiently large, little improvement can be achieved, especially when b H /b L is large (which is in accordance with the analytical results above). We can observe that the thresholds for which a notable improvement can be achieved is the same as the one for the viability of HP and LP (i.e. as described in Equation 11).
We now consider what would happen if HP and LP can customise the commitment deal they want to propose, i.e. any θ 1 and θ 2 can be proposed (instead of always being fair). Namely, Figure 4 shows the average population payoff varying these parameters, for different values of α. We observe that when α is small, the highest average payoff is achieved when θ 1 is sufficiently small and θ 2 is sufficiently large, while for large α, it is reverse for the two parameters. That is, in a highly competitive market (i.e. small α), commitment proposers should be strict (HP keeps sufficient benefit while LP requests sufficient payment, from their commitment partners), while when the market is less competitive (i.e. large α), commitment proposers should be more generous (HP proposes to give a larger benefit while LP requests a smaller payment, from their commitment partners). Our additional results confirm that this observation is robust for different values of , δ and game configurations.
Conclusions and Future Work
The present paper describes a novel model showing how prior commitments can be adopted as a tool for enhancing coordination when desirable coordination outcomes exhibit an asymmetric payoff structure. For that, we described a technology adoption game where technology investment firms would achieve the best collective outcome if they can coordinate with each other to adopt different technologies, with a parameter α capturing the competitiveness level of the product market and how beneficial it is to achieve coordination. In such a context, there are multiple desirable outcomes and players have distinct preferences in terms of which outcome should be agreed upon, thus leading to a larger behavioural space than in the context of cooperation dilemmas (Han et al., , 2017 . We have shown that whether commitment is a viable mechanism for promoting the evolution of coordination, strongly depends on α: when α is sufficiently small, prior commitment is highly abundant leading to significant improvement in terms of social welfare, compared to when commitment is absent. Importantly, we have derived the analytical condition for the threshold of α below which the success of commitments is guaranteed. Furthermore, whenever commitment proposers are allowed to freely choose which deal to propose to their co-players, our results show that, in a highly competitive market (i.e. small α), commitment proposers should be strict (i.e. sharing less benefits), while when the market is less competitive, commitment proposers should be more generous.
In short, our analysis has demonstrated that commitment is a viable tool for promoting the evolution of diverse collective behaviours among self-interested individuals, beyond the context of cooperation dilemmas where there is only one desirable collective outcome (Nesse, 2001) . In future work, we will consider how commitments can solve more complex collective problems, e.g. in a technological innovation race (Han et al., 2019) , where there might be a large number of desirable outcomes or equilibriums, especially when the number of players in an interaction increases (Duong and Han, 2015) . Also, we aim to compare data on technology adoption from developed and undeveloped countries with our model predictions.
